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This paper explores statistically the implications of the shift from communal to 
individualized tenure on the distribution of land and schooling between sons and 
daughters in matrilineal societies, based on a Sumatra case study.   The inheritance 
system is evolving from a strictly matrilineal system to a more egalitarian system in 
which sons and daughters inherit the type of land that is more intensive in their own work 
effort.  While gender bias is either non-existent or small in land inheritance, daughters 
tend to be disadvantaged with respect to schooling.  The gender gap in schooling, 
however, appears to be closing for the generation of younger children. 
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There is increasing evidence that land tenure institutions in customary land areas 
of developing countries are evolving from communal ownership towards individualized 
ownership in response to population pressure and the growing profitability of 
agroforestry devoted to commercial trees (Otsuka et al., 2000; Place and Otsuka, 2000a, 
2000b; Quisumbing et al., 2000).  While greater individualization is associated with more 
secure land rights (Ault and Rutman, 1979) and increased incentives to invest in land 
improvement  (Feder and Feeny, 1993; Besley, 1995), concerns have been raised 
regarding its equity impact, particularly on the distribution of land ownership rights by 
gender.  It has often been argued that a shift from communal land tenure towards 
individualized rights erodes women's land rights (Lastarria-Cornhiel, 1997).  This 
argument is often supported by the gradual disappearance of matrilineal inheritance and 
the rise of patrilineal inheritance systems, e.g., in some parts of South Asia (Agarwal, 
1994).  Whether such changes in land inheritance patterns necessarily lead to a net 
deterioration in women’s welfare, however, can only be ascertained if other forms of 
intergenerational transfers are also considered.  In economies with rapidly expanding 
nonfarm employment opportunities, education may be a more valuable form of 
investment in one’s children than agricultural land.   Empirical evidence on both land 
inheritance and other forms of transfers, however, is scanty. 
This study attempts to explore the evolution of education and land inheritance 
patterns in matrilineal societies based on a case study of Sumatra.  Throughout this 
region, land is traditionally bequeathed from a mother to her daughters. Joint ownership 
of paddy fields by lineage members or by sisters also has been common.  But for upland  
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fields growing commercial tree crops, such as rubber, cinnamon, and coffee, more 
individualized tenure institutions have become dominant and their incidence has been 
increasing.  Furthermore, matrilineal inheritance has been replaced by a bilateral system, 
or even by a patrilineal system in some areas (Otsuka et al., 2000).   
Suyanto et al. (2000a, 2000b) report that the individualization of land tenure 
institutions has helped eliminate management inefficiency in communal land tenure 
areas.  While individualization may have occurred to provide incentives to invest in tree 
planting and management, it is not clear why traditional matrilineal inheritance systems 
have become weaker.  In this study, we hypothesize that inheritance systems have 
changed to provide proper work incentives to men and women while maintaining gender 
equity in the distribution of resources.  We also hypothesize that differential investments 
in the education of sons and daughters have adjusted to the changes in the distribution of 
inherited land, insofar as land inheritance and education are alternative forms of 
intergenerational transfers (Estudillo et al., 2000a, 2000b).  
This paper explores statistically the allocation of land and schooling between sons 
and daughters along with the shift from communal to individualized tenure, in 
comparison with similar studies in the Philippines (Estudillo et al., 2000a, 2000b) and 
Ghana (Quisumbing and Otsuka, 2000).  Using a specially designed retrospective 
household survey of inheritance conducted in Western Sumatra, we relate changes in the 
distribution of land and schooling between sons and daughters to the individualization of 
land tenure institutions, the adoption of agroforestry, and differential labor inputs by men 
and women in traditional food crop production and agroforestry.  We also examine 
whether changing land inheritance patterns have shifted schooling investments between  
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boys and girls in the next generation.  We conclude that the individualization of land 
tenure institutions has contributed both to increased efficiency and equity in 
intergenerational transfers by promoting an inheritance system which rewards differential 





 A THEORY OF INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERS
i 
In the wealth model of transfers, parents are often assumed to be altruistic 
(Becker, 1974; Becker and Tomes, 1986) and care about their children’s future incomes 
as well as their own consumption.  Parents collectively maximize a utility function 
spanning generations, in which utility depends on consumption of parents (C), and the 
expected future incomes of the daughter (Yd) and son (Ys), which enter separately into 
the utility function (Up):  
   U p=Up (C, Yd, Ys)  .      (1) 
For simplicity, we assume that parents have one daughter and one son.  In a more 
general model, the number of children is a choice variable. 
An income generating function for i-th child is defined as 
 Y i = F (Ei, ai, gi) + G (Ei, Ai, gi) + ui ,   i = d, s     (2) 
where F and G are production functions of upland crops and lowland paddy, 
respectively; ai and Ai are inherited upland and lowland areas, respectively; Ei is the 
education level represented by schooling; gi is the gender of the child; i indexes the 
daughter and son; and ui is a stochastic component with mean zero and variance σi
2.  In 
this specification, child’s income is the sum of incomes from upland and lowland 
farming.  In an expanded model, the choice of nonfarm jobs and wage earnings, which 
are intensive in the use of human capital, can be also included. 
The income constraint for parents is  
 Y p = C + pE Σ Ei + pa Σ ai + pA Σ Ai  ,     (3)  
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where the income of parents Yp is spent on parental consumption of goods C (the 
numeraire), and expenditures on education (peΣEi) and asset transfers (paΣai + pAΣAi), in 
which the price of education is pe and the prices of the upland and lowland areas are pa 
and pA, respectively.  It is assumed that unit cost of a transfer is the same for each child.  
In most altruistic models, a parent maximizes (1) subject to (2) and (3) to obtain the 
optimal investments in human capital and asset transfers to the daughter and son. 
If the daughter were particularly efficient in generating income from lowland 
production, parents would bequeath larger lowland areas to her.  Conversely, if the son 
has a comparative advantage in using upland areas, due to greater physical strength 
required for clearing forest and bushland, parents would efficiently allocate more upland 
areas to him.  Actual land transfers to the daughter and son would then be unequal, 
depending on their comparative advantages.  
Suppose now that the relative prices of land and education change.   Even if the 
comparative advantage of each child remains the same, such changes will result in a new 
utility-maximizing equilibrium, leading parents to change the equilibrium allocation of 
the two types of land and education.  Alternatively, suppose that new technologies or 
crops are introduced, changing the comparative advantage of each child in generating 
income from land or education.  For example, the person who once had a comparative 
advantage in generating income from education-intensive activities now may be able to 
generate more income from land-intensive activities. If parents are concerned with 
efficiency and equity, parental allocations should change in response to changes in the 
external environment.  
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Parents may have different objectives that motivate transfers to children.  Such 
decisions may be based on future returns that the children would bring to them 
(Rosenzweig, 1986), preferences for inter-sibling equality (Behrman et al., 1982) or 
trade-offs between equity and efficiency (Pitt et al., 1990).  The parental allocation rules 
may be modified by disagreement between parents and also by non-altruistic transfer 
motives.  If parents disagree, or if they do not pool their incomes, the common preference 
model with a single parental utility function specified above does not hold, and the 
outcome of the allocation is the result of bargaining between parents (e.g., McElroy, 
1990). Like other household allocation outcomes (see Thomas (1990, 1994)), 
intergenerational transfers may reflect individualistic preferences of husband and wife in 
decision-making, and thus the differential bargaining power of parents may influence the 
allocation of land and education to children.   
Our null hypothesis is that parents are basically egalitarian with respect to 
intergenerational transfers.  In particular, we argue that parents pay attention to 
comparative advantages of daughters and sons in the cultivation of lowland and upland 
areas.  The null hypothesis of egalitarian parental motives is consistent with egalitarian 
cultural practices in Southeast Asia relative to South and East Asia:  according to a recent 
study of selected villages in the Philippines by Estudillo et al. (2000a, 2000b), sons work 
on rice farms more than daughters and inherit larger areas of paddy land, whereas 
daughters work in non-farm sectors more than sons and receive more schooling. 
AN APPLICATION TO MATRILINEAL SUMATRA 
Sumatra is a unique site to test models of intergenerational transfers due to its 
tradition of matrilineal inheritance and descent. Unmarried men typically work as farm  
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laborers, or emigrate to other areas to engage in non-farm work or establish a trade 
(Errington, 1984), and cultivate their wives’ land upon marriage.  Major decisions are 
vested in the lineage head, a maternal uncle.  Traditionally, the tie between a maternal 
uncle and his nieces or nephews (children of his sister) was stronger than the tie between 
a man and his children. 
Classification of property and its transmission across generations also occur along 
gender-differentiated lines.  Minangkabau society classifies property into two types: 
harto pusako, or "ancestral property,” and harto pancarian or "earned property" (Kahn, 
1980, p. 26).
ii   A very similar distinction between ancestral or family land and privately 
acquired property is made in Ghanaian uterine matrilineal societies  (Quisumbing and 
Otsuka, 2000).  Ancestral property belongs to the lineage, while earned property can be 
obtained or purchased with one’s own efforts.  For example, irrigated rice land, the 
ancestral homestead, gold, and water buffaloes are classified as ancestral property, while 
tools and workshops are "earned property.”  These two forms of property are subject to 
different systems of inheritance.  Ancestral property is always inherited by women, and 
almost always passes from mother to daughters.  In contrast, rules of inheritance for 
earned or acquired property are relatively flexible.   The owner is free to sell, mortgage, 
or give away acquired property.  Earned property can also be passed on to either sex, but 
reverts back to ancestral property in the next generation.
iii  Thus, men were allowed to 
accumulate only earned property.    
The growth of the cash economy and the advent of commercial tree crops in the 
19
th century increased the economic significance of earned property.  Aside from its 
association with commercial and artisanial activities, earned property also pertained to  
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newly opened agricultural land (Kato, 1982, p. 169), which could be inherited by men.
iv  
Fathers gradually became more important than maternal uncles in land bestowals.  
Education offered another way for a father to invest his earned property: investment in 
his children could not be contested by his matrilineal relatives after his death (Kato, 1982, 
p. 183).  Traditionally, sons were more educated than daughters, as they often work in 
non-farm sectors in which returns to education tend to be higher. 
The anthropological and ethnographic evidence strongly suggests that inheritance 
regimes are not static.  Although they may appear to be enshrined in custom and 
tradition, they have evolved in response to changing relative scarcity of land and 
population and income-earning opportunities in lowland and upland areas (Otsuka et al., 
2000).  In terms of the theoretical framework specified above, the advent of 
commercialization changed the relative values of paddy land and agroforestry land in 
favor of the latter, and since men were more intensively involved in opening up new land 
for agroforestry, their income possibility frontiers shifted as well.  Thus, it is quite 
possible that parents who wanted to maximize lifetime utility would want to give more 




Suppose that parents can transfer either assets (land) or human capital (or 
education represented by schooling) to their children.  To investigate the determinants of 
the distribution of education and land among sons and daughters, we estimate a transfer 



























levels of education, paddy land, agroforestry land, and bush-fallow land inherited by 
child i in family j.  Regression parameters ßk and γm are vectors of coefficients for each 
type of transfer; Xc is a vector of child characteristics such as sex, birth year, and 
dummies for the eldest and youngest children; Xf  and  Xm  are vectors of exogenous 
human and physical wealth of father and mother at the time of marriage, respectively; D 
is the daughter dummy; and εij is the error term in each equation.   
To account for the possibility that husband and wife do not have identical 
preferences regarding bestowals to children, an empirical specification consistent with a 
collective model of the household is used.
v  Thus, father’s and mother’s wealth at the 
time of marriage, which are exogenous to decisions made within marriage, enter 
separately into the regressions.  Parental wealth consists of human capital, as proxied by 
years of schooling, and each parents' inherited holdings of paddy land, agroforestry land, 
and bush-fallow areas.  In our sites in Indonesia, assets at marriage devolve to their 
respective owners in case of divorce; these have been used as proxies for threat points or  
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bargaining power (Thomas et al., 1997).  Parents' inherited land holdings are divided by 
the number of potential heirs to account for the effect of population pressure (larger 
family sizes) on transfers to the next generation.  If the coefficients of the same wealth 
variables for father and mother are significantly different from each other, the unitary 
model of household decision-making is rejected.   
We also include the number of brothers and sisters in the regression, to test 
whether sibling rivalry affects the allocation of land and education to children (Butcher 
and Case, 1994).  Parental land assets and schooling are interacted with the daughter 
dummy to test whether parents with more physical and human capital treat children of 
different sexes differentially.
vi  If the interaction terms with parental characteristics are 
significantly different from each other, the unitary model is also rejected.  
A final test of the unitary model involves comparing the sum of the coefficient on 
parental wealth variable and the coefficient of its relevant interaction term with child 
gender with the corresponding sum for the opposite-sex parent. This sum, which captures 
the total effect of the parental characteristic, includes gender interactions, in contrast to 
the partial effect, which simply compares the coefficients on the wealth variables.  If the 
sums are significantly different from each other, this is inconsistent with the unitary 
model.  
Equation (4) is estimated both in levels and with family fixed effects.  Since land 
transfers are subject to censoring (many children do not receive any land), a tobit 
procedure is used for the land regressions in levels.  However, it is possible that omitted 
family-level variables are correlated with regressors, and thus their estimated effects on 
transfers may be biased.  For those families with at least two children, the within family  
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allocation can be used as the source of variation in the sample from which to estimate 
intrahousehold differences in transfers.
vii  A fixed effects estimation procedure could 
control for these unobservables using family-specific dummy variables.
viii  In this specific 
application, however, only the child's sex, birth year, the eldest and youngest dummies, 
and interaction between child sex and parent characteristics remain as explanatory 
variables.  That is, the effects of variables that do not vary across children cannot be 
identified.
ix  For simplicity, we report only the level results in this article, because there 
are no crucial differences in the estimation results between the two methods.
x    
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INHERITANCE AND EDUCATION IN SUMATRA 
 
STUDY SITES AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
 
We conducted a retrospective survey of land inheritance and schooling in two 
areas of the buffer zone of the Kerinci Seblat National Park in West Sumatra.  Kerinci, 
where cinnamon is a major tree crop, is called the Middle Region.  Bungo Tebo, located 
in a low-lying area, is called the Low Region, where rubber is the major tree crop.
xi  Sixty 
households in each site were randomly selected from the households included in a related 
survey on agroforestry and the evolution of land tenure institutions (see Suyanto et al., 
2000a, 2000b).   Table 1 presents the distribution and average size of the owned and/or 
cultivated land of the sample households in the Middle and Low Regions.  In the Middle 
Region, most of the households own or cultivate both lowland rice fields and upland 
cinnamon fields.  Since land is scarce in this area, only 47 percent of households report 
having bush-fallow land.  In the Low Region, where land is more abundant, around three-
quarters of households have bush-fallow land.  Around 90 percent have plots devoted to 
mature rubber, 88 percent have lowland rice fields, and a smaller percentage (17%) have 






TABLE 1--Distribution and Average Size of Owned/Cultivated 
a Plots by land Use, Middle Region and 






















              
Total 370  1.18  60   180 1.35  60 
Lowland rice fields  136  0.49  59    96  0.64  53 
Young cinnamon fields 
b 96  1.33  52    n.a.
e  n.a. n.a 
Productive cinnamon  fields 
c 154  1.25  53   n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Upland rice fields  n.a.  n.a.          n.a.    10  0.73  10 
Young rubber fields 
d n.a.  n.a.  n.a.    30  0.75  25 
Mature rubber fields 
d n.a.  n.a.  n.a.    79  1.45  55 
Bush –  fallow  30  1.66  28  61  1.58  46 
           
 
Note:    (a) Owned under joint-family ownership, owner-cultivated under other ownership systems, and cultivated under tenancy and 
borrowing arrangements. 
(b) Young cinnamon fields refer to those with trees of age one to three. 
(c) Productive cinnamon fields refer to those with trees of age four and above. 
(d) Young and mature rubber fields refer to those with dominant tree age of zero to seven and eight and above, respectively.  







Table 2 shows that in the Middle Region 40 percent of owned or cultivated lowland 
rice fields is owned jointly by daughters or by daughters and sons together.   
TABLE 2--Land Tenure Distribution of Owned/Cultivated 
 Plots by Land Use Type, Middle 
Region (%) 
 

















Daughters 4.4  0.0  0.0 
Daughters & sons  37.5  0.0  0.0 
Sons 0.0  0.0  0.0 
      
Single family  27.2  33.3  37.7 
Daughters 1.5  1.0  0.6 
Daughters & sons  22.8  27.1  35.1 
Sons 2.9  5.2  2.0 
      
Borrowing 5.1  11.5  11.7 
Private – purchase  6.6  25.0  18.2 
Private – forest clearance  0.7  18.7  22.1 
Share/fixed rent tenancy  18.4  11.5  10.4 
      
 
At the time of our survey, the latter type of the joint family ownership was more 
prevalent.  Around 27 percent of owned or cultivated paddy plots are under single-family 
ownership, in which individual households of both daughters and sons acquired ownership 
through inheritance.  Thus, it seems that even in the category of "ancestral land," under 
which paddy land has traditionally been classified, the inheritance system seems to have 
evolved to include both daughters and sons as legitimate heirs.  Both young and mature 
cinnamon fields are more likely to fall under single family ownership (by both daughters and 






In the Low Region (Table 3), lineage land can be found only in upland rice, 
accounting for 70 percent of upland rice plots 

















Communal/lineage 0.0  70.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 
          
Joint family  55.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.3 
Daughters   49.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Daughters & sons  6.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.3 
Sons 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
          
Single family  7.2  0.0  33.3  29.1  41.0 
Daughters  1.0  0.0  6.7  0.0  8.2 
Daughters & sons  1.0  0.0  3.3  2.5  6.6 
Sons 5.2  0.0  23.3  26.6  26.2 
          
Private-purchase 10.4 0.0  33.3  49.4  22.9 
Private-forest clearance  0.0  0.0  13.3  8.9  31.2 
Renting 14.6  0.0  0.0  8.9  0.0 
Borrowing 11.5  20.0  13.3  3.8  0.0 
Others 1.0  10.0  6.7  0.0  1.6 
          
 
 
 Most joint family land is found in lowland rice fields, and almost 50 percent of lowland rice 
plots are jointly owned by daughters.  Only 7 percent of lowland rice fields are under single 
family ownership.  In contrast, ownership of rubber plots is more individualized.  Single 
family ownership and private purchase are the dominant tenure categories for young and 
mature rubber plots.   Rubber plots have also been acquired by forest clearance, accounting 
for 13 percent of young rubber plots and around 9 percent of mature rubber plots.   Finally, 






forest clearance (31%), and private purchase (23%).  For both rubber and bush-fallow areas, 
single family ownership is dominated by ownership by sons.   
The distribution of plots by land tenure status seems to indicate that in the Middle 
Region, traditional inheritance systems are gradually shifting to a more egalitarian system 
whereby both sons and daughters inherit.  In the Low Region, on the other hand, the 
evolution of inheritance systems seems to have gone further, with women specializing in 
paddy land and sons in agroforestry and bush-fallow areas.   
In order to explore why land tenure institutions and inheritance systems have evolved 
along different paths in the two regions, we examine the relative labor contributions of men 
and women to lowland and upland rice cultivation, and the two major tree crops, cinnamon 













































  Mean  %   Mean  %   Mean  %   Mean  %   Mean  %   Mean  % 
                          
Family  labor                          
Men  37.0  57.5  25.8  54.7   5.1  30.2   47.7  31.8  32.3  82.6  48.4  90.6 
Women  27.4  42.5  21.4  45.3  11.8  69.8   102.5  68.2   6.8  17.4   5.0  9.4 
Total  64.4  100.0   47.2  100.0   16.9  100.0  150.2 100.0   39.1  100.0   53.4  100.0 
                          
Total                          
Men  120.0  54.2  32.0  47.3  15.2  61.3   53.6  30.5  35.1  67.9  87.6  92.3 
Women  101.6  45.8  35.7  52.7   9.6  38.7   121.9  69.5  16.6  32.1   7.3  7.7 
Total  221.6 100.0   67.7  100.0   24.8  100.0  175.5 100.0   51.7  100.0   94.9  100.0 
                          
 






In the Middle Region, wet rice and cinnamon use male and female labor relatively 
equally.  Male family labor accounts for 57% of family labor input and female labor 
comprises 43% in wet rice cultivation.  While young cinnamon uses slightly more male 
family labor -- males contribute 55% and females 45%--women are more involved in 
mature cinnamon cultivation, accounting for 70% of family labor input.  When both hired 
and family labor are considered, cultivation of wet rice and young cinnamon uses 
relatively equal amounts of male and female labor. 
In the Low Region, upland rice is very intensive in female family labor: women 
contribute 68% of family labor input, and men only 32%.  Although the relevant data 
were not collected in this particular study, it is known that female labor dominates in 
lowland rice cultivation.  However, both young and mature rubber plots utilize substantial 
inputs from male family members: men contribute 83% of family labor in young rubber 
and 91% in mature rubber.  The relative proportions of male and female labor input do 
not change substantially when we consider both family and hired labor.  The relatively 
high use of male labor arises from the type of rubber agroforestry in this region, the so-
called "jungle rubber," in which woody species are densely grown among the rubber trees 
(Gouyon et al., 1993), so that it is difficult for women to work.  In contrast, cinnamon 
trees are grown in rows and hence cinnamon fields are easily accessible to women.  Such 
differences would reflect comparative advantages in the cultivation of wet rice and tree 







The retrospective survey on inheritance was patterned after similar surveys in the 
Philippines (Quisumbing, 1994; Estudillo, et al., 2000a, 2000b) and in Ghana 
(Quisumbing and Otsuka, 2000), and included questions on the parents, siblings, and 
children of the respondents, yielding information on three generations called the parents', 
respondents, and children's generations.
xiii    The respondents were asked about schooling 
and landownership of their parents and in-laws, the schooling and inheritance of their 
spouses, and schooling and proposed bequests to their children.   Each respondent was 
also asked to list all of his or her siblings, their dates of birth, their educational 
attainment, and the areas of paddy land, agroforestry land, and bush fallow land which 
they received or expected to receive from their parents.  In many cases, respondents 
received land at marriage, but stood to inherit more land after their parents' death. 
Table 5 presents the average landholdings by type, and years of schooling of the 






TABLE 5--Schooling and Landholdings of Parent and Respondents' Generations,  









         Low Region 
  Mean (hectares)  Std. deviation   
 













Father   
Years of schooling  3.67  2.95   
 
2.90 1.70 
Inherited paddy  0.61  1.10   
 
0.11 0.26 
Inherited agroforestry land  0.44  1.02   
 
0.57 1.60 





Years of schooling  2.77  2.59   
 
1.73 1.61 
Inherited paddy  0.67  1.07   
 
0.47 0.57 
Inherited agroforestry land  0.40  0.96   
 
0.41 1.45 













     Year of birth  1956  15.58    1957  13.96 
      Years of schooling  8.92  4.23   
 
7.07 3.39 
Inherited paddy  0.23  0.30   
 
0.07 0.20 
Inherited agroforestry land  0.23  0.64   
 
0.33 0.86 






Year of birth  1958  12.97   
 
1956 14.83 
Years of schooling  8.02  4.04   
 
4.57 2.78 
Inherited paddy  0.21  0.31   
 
0.20 0.29 
Inherited agroforestry land  0.28  0.74    0.18  0.82 






          
 
In both regions, fathers are better educated than mothers, by at least one year of 
schooling.  Years of completed schooling increase in the respondent generation:  in 
contrast to their fathers, who had 3.3 years of schooling, sons have about 8 years of 
schooling on the average.  Daughters have lower educational attainments than sons, at 6.3 
years on the average.  Educational attainments are lower and the gender gap is much 
larger for both generations in the Low Region than in the Middle Region.  To some 
extent, the lower schooling attainment of women in the Low Region seems to be 
compensated for by their larger holdings of owned paddy land, which is far more 
valuable than upland fields. 
In contrast to the gender difference in schooling, mothers' inherited landholdings 
were generally larger than their husbands' in the parents' generation.  This pattern no 
longer holds in the respondents' generation.  In the Middle Region, daughters and sons 
have approximately equal inherited areas of paddy land, but daughters have larger 
inherited agroforestry areas and smaller bush-fallow areas.  In the Low Region, daughters 
maintain the matrilineal custom of inheriting paddy land, but receive substantially smaller 
areas of agroforestry land and bush-fallow land. 
DETERMINANTS OF WEALTH TRANSFER IN THE  
RESPONDENT GENERATION 
 
Tables 6 and 7 present regression results on the levels of education (years of 






Low Regions, respectively.  Schooling equations were estimated using ordinary least 
squares, with standard errors corrected for household clustering.   
TABLE 6--Determinants of Schooling and Land Inheritance by Respondents and Siblings,  








Constant -1444.18  -858.52  -2006.04  -6925.12 
Daughter -1.53  0.02  0.08  3.70 
Birth year  1.40  0.88**  2.05*  7.13 
Birth year squared 
d  -335.83 -225.56** -524.05*  -1835.61 
Eldest -0.60  -0.05  -0.23  -0.70 
Youngest -0.73  -0.02  -0.15  -1.09 
No . of brothers  -0.01  0.01  0.00  -0.74 
No. of sisters  0.38  -0.03*  -0.09*  -1.32 
Father's schooling  -0.15  0.01  0.02  0.60* 
Mother's schooling  0.28  0.01  0.06  -0.90 
Father's paddy land  1.59  0.38**  -0.17  -0.37 
Mother's paddy land  3.73*  0.62**  -0.71  0.33 
Father's agroforestry land  -2.44  -0.15  1.27**  1.43 
Mother's agroforestry land  -0.20  0.44*  0.69  0.37 
Father's bush-fallow land  -10.35**  0.18  1.25  8.20 
Mother's bush fallow land  -4.45  1.64**  1.11  21.62 
Daughter x father's schooling  -0.03  -0.00  -0.02  -1.09 
Daughter x mother's schooling  0.28  -0.01  -0.02  -2.38 
Daughter x father's paddy land  -2.71**  -0.13  -0.47  -40.24 
Daughter x mother's paddy land  -1.96  0.25  -0.40  4.82 
Daughter x father's agroforestry land  4.23**  0.01  0.76*  -40.97 
Daughter x mother's agroforestry land  0.21  0.40  0.40  -12.08 
Daughter x father's bush fallow land  6.06**  -0.36  -0.75  -6.14 
Daughter x mother's bush fallow land  3.38  -1.84**  -0.48  37.88 
Sigma   0.24  0.71  2.31 
Number of observations  292  292  292  292 
Uncensored   254  160  19 
Log-likelihood   -28.79  -229.03  -58.35 
F-statistic (p-value)  29.34 (0.00)**       
Chi-squared (p-value)    180.94 (0.00)**  172.79 (0.00)**  71.01 (0.00)** 
R-squared 0.28       
Pseudo R-squared    0.76  0.27  0.38 
Hypothesis tests: F test (p-value)        
Father’s schooling=Mother’s 
schooling 
0.95 (0.33)  0.10 (0.76)  0.44 (0.51)  5.79(0.02)* 











Father’s agroforestry land=Mother’s 
agroforestry land 
0.42 (0.52)  1.84 (0.18)  0.83 (0.36)  0.06 (0.81) 
Father’s bush-fallow land=Mother’s 
bush-fallow land 
0.35 (0.56)  3.79 (0.05)*  0.00 (0.95)  1.02 (0.31) 
Gender interaction terms with 
schooling equal 
0.60 (0.44)  0.01 (0.94)  0.00 (0.98)  0.15 (0.70) 
Gender interaction terms with paddy 
equal 
0.10 (0.75)  4.90 (0.03)*  0.01 (0.93)  0.22 (0.64) 
Gender interaction terms with 
agroforestry equal 
1.51 (0.22)  2.72 (0.10)  0.27 (0.61)  2.11 (0.15) 
Gender interaction terms with bush-
fallow equal 
0.10 (0.75)  2.92 (0.09)  0.01 (0.92)  0.43 (0.51) 
Schooling plus interaction terms equal  6.01(0.02)*  0.04 (0.85)  0.32 (0.57)  0.71 (0.40) 
Paddy plus interaction terms equal  3.23 (0.08)  21.63 (0.00)**  0.45 (0.50)  0.23 (0.63) 
Agroforestry plus interaction terms 
equal 
1.81 (0.18)  1.04 (0.31)  10.30 (0.00)**  1.99 (0.16) 
Bush-fallow plus interaction terms 
equal 
0.46 (0.50)  0.00 (0.95)  0.01 (0.93)  0.68 (0.41) 
 
Note:  (a) Estimated coefficients are shown.  ** indicates significance at 1 percent level; * at 5 percent  
level, according to two-tailed t-test. 
(b) OLS with robust standard errors, clustered on households. 
(c)  Tobit estimates. 






TABLE 7--Determinants of Schooling and Land Inheritance by Respondents and Siblings, 








Constant -4118.16  -312.19  348.23  -3140.05 
Daughter -2.28**  0.47**  1.70  -4.12* 
Birth year  4.16  0.32  -0.37  3.20 
Birth year squared 
d  -1051.11 -80.04  99.96  -817.56 
Eldest -0.45  0.03  -0.12  -0.22 
Youngest 0.00  0.07  0.94  -0.73* 
No . of brothers  0.30  0.01  -0.58**  -0.70** 
No. of sisters  0.17  -0.06**  0.07  -0.04 
Father's schooling  0.28  0.05*  0.18  0.32** 
Mother's schooling  0.02  0.01  0.37*  -0.01 
Father's paddy land  -0.56  0.87*  3.28  -1.07 
Mother's paddy land  4.05*  0.86**  -3.90  -1.03 
Father's agroforestry land  1.31  -0.10  3.52**  -0.59 
Mother's agroforestry land  0.32  -0.14  1.85**  1.19** 
Father's bush-fallow land  -1.25*  -0.20  -1.02  1.32** 
Mother's bush fallow land  -1.00*  0.09  -0.02  1.62** 
Daughter x father's schooling  -0.14  -0.02  -2.22*  0.53* 
Daughter x mother's schooling  -0.00  -0.04  -16.45  0.50 
Daughter x father's paddy land  -0.98  0.73  31.42  0.47 
Daughter x mother's paddy land  -1.96  0.64  3.30  -4.58 
Daughter x father's agroforestry land  0.93  0.01  9.07  2.06 
Daughter x mother's agroforestry land  0.75  0.21  4.78*  2.47* 
Daughter x father's bush fallow land  0.62  -0.05  e  1.95 
Daughter x mother's bush fallow land  2.35**  -1.08  e  -1.10 
Sigma   0.31  1.44  1.23 
Number of observations  247  247  247  247 
Uncensored  247 93 44 51 
Log-likelihood   -82.29  -107.89  -121.16 
F-statistic (p-value)  18.75 (0.00)**       
Chi-squared (p-value)    148.28 (0.00)** 140.17 (0.00)**  139.37 (0.00)** 
R-squared 0.38       
Pseudo R-squared    0.47  0.39  0.37 
Hypothesis tests: F test (p-value)        
Father’s schooling=Mother’s 
schooling 
0.92 (0.34)  1.19 (0.28)  0.91 (0.34)  4.93 (0.03)* 
Father’s paddy=Mother’s paddy  1.29 (0.26)  0.00 (0.98)  3.49 (0.06)  0.00 (0.99) 
Father’s agroforestry land=Mother’s 
agroforestry land 
0.75 (0.39)  0.04 (0.84)  5.05 (0.03)*  4.22 (0.04)* 
Father’s bush-fallow land=Mother’s 
bush-fallow land 
0.11 (0.74)  1.48 (0.22)  0.53 (0.47)  0.25 (0.62) 
Gender interaction terms with 
schooling equal 











Gender interaction terms with paddy 
equal 
0.05 (0.82)  0.01 (0.91)  0.99(0.32)  0.30 (0.58) 
Gender interaction terms with 
agroforestry equal 
0.01 (0.92)  0.52 (0.47)  0.44 (0.51)  0.05 (0.83) 
Gender interaction terms with bush-
fallow equal 
1.87 (0.18)  2.10 (0.15)  e  4.13 (0.04)* 
Schooling plus interaction terms equal  0.08 (0.78)  2.71 (0.10)  1.48 (0.22)  3.04 (0.08) 
Paddy plus interaction terms equal  1.90 (0.17)  0.03 (0.87)  1.58 (0.21)  0.31 (0.58) 
Agroforestry plus interaction terms 
equal 
0.50 (0.48)  0.66 (0.42)  0.86 (0.36)  1.71 (0.19) 
Bush-fallow plus interaction terms 
equal 
6.24 (0.02)*  1.20 (0.27)  e  4.27 (0.04) 
 
Note:  (a)  Estimated coefficients are shown.  ** indicates significance at 1 percent level; * at 5 percent 
level according to two-tailed t-test. 
(b) OLS with robust standard errors, clustered on households. 
(c)  Tobit estimates. 
(d) (Birthyear/1000) squared. 
(e)Variables not included due to non-convergence.  
 
 
From Table 6, the following observations can be made.  First, the gender effect is 
insignificant.  None of the coefficients of the daughter dummy are significant according 
to the two-tailed t-test, which suggests the absence of gender bias against daughters.  If 
we apply a one-tailed test, however, the coefficient is significantly negative at the 5 
percent level in the schooling regression, both in the levels and fixed-effect estimates.  
Thus, we cannot deny the tendency for daughters to be disfavored in schooling 
investments.  An increase in the number of sisters reduces the inherited paddy and 
agroforestry areas, whereas an increase in the number of brothers has no such effect.  
Second, mother’s paddy land ownership has a positive effect on schooling.  Mothers 
seem to exhibit greater concern for their children’s schooling than do fathers, and those 
with larger paddy areas tend to send their children for further study.  F-statistics reported 






different from that of father’s.  Third, father’s bush-fallow land has a negative effect on 
schooling.  The larger bush-fallow area of fathers is associated with lower schooling 
attainment of children, which would reflect the relatively low returns to schooling when 
ample areas of uncultivated land exist.  It seems that uncultivated land and schooling are 
substitutable means of transferring wealth from one generation to another.  The 
coefficient on father’s bush-fallow land is significantly different from the mother’s 
coefficient.  
Fourth, it may seem that mothers express weaker gender preference than fathers 
with respect to their asset holdings.  Four interaction terms between the daughter dummy 
and mother’s human and physical assets are all insignificant except for one case. In 
contrast, three interaction terms between the daughter dummy and father’s land 
ownership are significant in the schooling regression.  The results imply that while 
fathers who own larger paddy areas are less likely to keep their daughters in school, they 
are more likely to do so if they own large upland fields.  Despite the differential effect of 
paddy land and bush-fallow land, it is only in the case of gender interactions with paddy 
land that father’s and mother’s effects are significantly different from each other.  Lastly, 
land inheritance persists over generations.  Larger parental holdings per capita of specific 
types of land typically lead to larger areas bequeathed to children.   
To sum up, the findings that some father- or mother-specific asset ownership 
variables are significantly different from each other in the wealth transfer decisions imply 
that the unitary model of household behavior is rejected.  These differences are associated 






However, the insignificance of the daughter dummy, as well as its generally insignificant 
interactions with parental wealth variables, strongly indicate that wealth transfers in this 
community are largely egalitarian with respect to gender.  These qualitative conclusions 
remain unchanged with the fixed-effects estimation. 
Despite distinct differences in climatic conditions, population pressure, and type 
of tree crops grown between the two regions, the estimation results for the Low Region 
shown in Table 7 are not markedly different, with major exceptions being the significant 
and negative coefficient of the daughter dummy and the insignificance of the interaction 
terms between the daughter dummy and father’s asset ownership.  In other words, 
daughters are significantly disadvantaged with respect to schooling and inheritance of 
bush-fallow land, but are favored with respect to inheritance of paddy land.  Daughters 
receiving larger areas of paddy land, with sons being compensated by more years of 
schooling, is consistent with the tradition of the matrilineal inheritance system.  That sons 
inherit more bush-fallow land is a new custom, consistent with the requirement of men’s 
labor for future development of such land.  The result that more sisters decrease one’s 
inheritance of paddy land, while more brothers decrease receipts of agroforestry and 
bush-fallow areas is also consistent with the differences in comparative advantages in 
lowland and upland farming between daughters and sons.  These differences are likely to 
reflect both efficiency and egalitarian motives of parents.   
We reject the unitary model only for differences in the effects of parental 
schooling and differences in the interaction terms with bush-fallow land in the case of the 






by fathers and mothers and the insignificant effects of their interactions with the daughter 
dummy, the rejection of the unitary model is weaker in the Low Region than in the 
Middle Region.  This is not surprising since households in the Middle Region still cling 
more strongly to traditional matrilineal systems which give greater bargaining power to 
wives rather than husbands.  In general, parents are not only egalitarian but also tend to 
pool their resources in making wealth transfer decisions in the Low Region. 
DETERMINANTS OF SCHOOLING IN THE CHILD GENERATION 
While land inheritance systems seem to have been evolving in favor of sons, the 
persistence of gender bias against daughters in schooling, particularly in the Low Region, 
is worrisome, since low schooling levels would limit women’s chance of seeking non-
agricultural employment.  Does this bias persist in the generation of the respondents’ 
children?  We thus examine intrahousehold differences in schooling attainment in the 
children’s generation.  Altogether we have 178 observations on children in school, i.e., 
those between 7 and 21 years of age. 
Unlike the respondent and his or her siblings, schooling decisions for the 
respondents’ children are not yet complete.  To take into account incomplete schooling 
decisions, we use two individual level outcomes:  (i) the deviation of each child’s 
completed years of schooling from the cohort mean; and (ii) actual years of completed 
schooling, controlling for child age.
xiv  In the first specification, we are measuring how 
well each child is doing relative to other children of the same age.  In the second, we 
control for the correlation between age and schooling completion by including linear and 






not prone to censoring, unlike schooling attainment, which could be censored at zero.  In 
order to test whether family-specific unobservables or individual heterogeneity are 
important, we estimated both fixed- and random-effects estimates.  In both regions, the 
Lagrange multiplier test indicates that individual heterogeneity is important.  Moreover, 
the Hausman test does not lead us to reject random effects in favor of fixed effects (with 
the exception of schooling attainment in the Low Region).  This suggests that differences 
in schooling can be explained by factors that vary across families and individuals, rather 
than by unobserved family characteristics.  
According to the estimation results of schooling functions in Tables 8 and 9, the 


























Constant -2.81  -13.64  -3.98  -15.20 
Daughter 2.49  3.91  2.14  3.32** 
Birth year  -0.06  1.59**  0.11  1.80** 
Birth year squared   0.01  -0.03**  0.00  -0.03** 
No . of brothers  -0.28  -0.22  -0.23  -0.25 
No. of sisters  -0.09  0.02  -0.29  -0.12 
Father's schooling  0.13  0.15  0.17  0.21 
Mother's schooling  0.21  0.36  0.14  0.27* 
Father's paddy land  -0.87  -0.44  -1.78  -1.52 
Mother's paddy land  3.63  3.00  3.93  3.32 
Father's agroforestry land  -0.77  -0.65  -0.21  -0.14 
Mother's agroforestry land  -1.27*  -1.09  -1.49**  -1.30** 
Father's bush-fallow land  0.94  1.36  0.68  0.92 
Mother's bush fallow land  -6.21  -5.88  -6.07*  -5.96* 
Daughter x father's schooling  -0.12  -0.15  -0.15  -0.18 
Daughter x mother's schooling  -0.15  -0.31  -0.06  -0.19 
Daughter x father's paddy land  0.60  -0.57  2.40  1.59 
Daughter x mother's paddy land  -3.49  -3.10  -4.06  -3.72 
Daughter x father's agroforestry land  0.69  0.64  0.06  0.02 
Daughter x mother's agroforestry land  1.03  1.49  1.80  2.24 
Daughter x father's bush fallow land  -0.87  -1.28  -.71  -0.92 
Daughter x mother's bush fallow land  6.68  5.96  6.18*  5.69* 
Number of observations  70  70  69  69 
F-statistic (p-value)  4.39 (0.00)**  10.02 (0.00)**     
Chi-squared (p-value)      29.97 (0.09)  621.12 (0.00)** 
R-squared 0.40  0.89     
Breusch-Pagan LM test (p-value)      5.59 (0.02)*  6.91 (0.01)** 
Hausman test (FE vs. RE) (p-value)      5.61 (0.90)  12.79 (0.31) 
Hypothesis tests: F test (p-value)       
Father’s schooling=Mother’s schooling  0.03 (0.87)  0.24 (0.62)  0.03 (0.87)  0.11 (0.74) 
Father’s paddy=Mother’s paddy  1.06 (0.31)  0.74 (0.39)  4.72 (0.03)*  3.86 (0.05)* 
Father’s agroforestry land=Mother’s 
agroforestry land 
0.36 (0.55)  0.41 (0.53)  2.20 (0.14)  2.07 (0.15) 
Father’s bush-fallow land=Mother’s bush-
fallow land 
4.40 (0.04)*  5.19 (0.03)*  4.61 (0.03)*  5.49 (0.02)* 
Schooling interaction terms equal  0.00 (0.95)  0.13 (0.72)  0.03 (0.87)  0.00 (0.99) 
Paddy interaction terms equal  0.83 (0.37)  0.38 (0.54)  4.72 (0.03)*  3.39 (0.07) 






















Bush-fallow interaction terms equal  4.70 (0.04)*  5.10 (0.03)*  4.61 (0.03)*  4.92 (0.03)* 
Schooling plus interaction terms equal  0.24 (0.63)  0.28 (0.60)  0.16 (0.68)  0.13 (0.72) 
Paddy plus interaction terms equal  0.38 (0.54)  2.10 (0.15)  0.13 (0.71)  0.07 (0.79) 
Agroforestry plus interaction terms equal  0.06 (0.81)  0.42 (0.52)  0.03 (0.87)  0.84 (0.36) 
Bush-fallow plus interaction terms equal  0.46 (0.50)  0.00 (0.99)  0.09 (0.76)  0.12 (0.73) 
 
Note:  (a)  Estimated coefficients are shown.  ** indicates significance at 1 percent level; * at 5 percent 
level, according to two-tailed t-test.  


























Constant -1.62  -9.99  -1.62  -8.55 
Daughter -0.49  -1.33  -.47  -0.80 
Birth year  0.24  1.66**  0.25  1.50** 
Birth year squared   -0.01  -0.04**  -0.01  -0.03* 
No . of brothers  -0.19  -0.12  -0.19  --- 
No. of sisters  -0.10  -0.05  -0.11  --- 
Father's schooling  0.05  0.04  0.05  --- 
Mother's schooling  -0.04  -0.07  -0.05  --- 
Father's paddy land  -2.82  -3.51**  -2.83*  --- 
Mother's paddy land  1.50**  0.78*  1.48**  --- 
Father's agroforestry land  0.30*  0.39**  0.29  --- 
Mother's agroforestry land  1.54**  2.20**  1.56  --- 
Father's bush-fallow land  0.22  0.17  0.23  --- 
Mother's bush fallow land  0.62  0.79  0.64  --- 
Daughter x father's schooling  0.04  0.05  0.04  -0.01 
Daughter x mother's schooling  0.12  0.24  0.12  0.20 
Daughter x father's paddy land  1.27  1.43  1.41  1.88 
Daughter x mother's paddy land  -0.47  0.94  -0.56  -0.82 
Daughter x father's agroforestry land  -0.48  -0.54  -0.44  0.14 
Daughter x mother's agroforestry land  -0.11  -0.80  -0.15  -0.70 
Daughter x father's bush fallow land  -0.16  -0.19  -0.4  -0.07 
Daughter x mother's bush fallow land  0.02  0.22  0.00  0.62 
Number of observations  108  108  107  107 
F-statistic (p-value)  12.29 (0.00)**  7.82 (0.00)**    15.02 (0.00)** 
Chi-squared (p-value)      27.31 (0.16)   
R-squared 0.25  0.75     
Breusch-Pagan LM test (p-value)       12.09 (0.00)**  14.68 (0.00)** 
Hausman test (FE vs. RE) (p-value)      3.39 (1.00)  357.43 (0.00)** 
Hypothesis tests: F test (p-value)        
Father’s schooling=Mother’s schooling  0.32 (0.57)  0.72 (0.40)  0.30 (0.59)  n. a. 
Father’s paddy=Mother’s paddy  7.80 (0.01)**  11.62 (0.00)**  8.97 (0.00)**  n. a. 
Father’s agroforestry land=Mother’s 
agroforestry land 
10.29 (0.00)**  22.01 (0.00)**  0.64 (0.42)  n. a. 
Father’s bush-fallow land=Mother’s bush-
fallow land 
0.51 (0.48)  1.83 (0.18)  0.47 (0.49)  n. a.  
Schooling interaction terms equal  0.16 (0.69)  0.58 (0.45)  0.09 (0.76)  0.38 (0.54) 
Paddy interaction terms equal  0.84 (0.37)  0.04 (0.84)  0.90 (0.34)  0.62 (0.43) 





















Bush-fallow interaction terms equal  0.10 (0.76)  0.30 (0.59)  0.02 (0.90)  0.22 (0.64) 
Schooling plus interaction terms equal  0.00 (0.97)  0.10 (0.76)  0.01 (0.93)  n. a. 
Paddy plus interaction terms equal  1.62 (0.21)  1.78 (0.19)  2.12 (0.15)  n. a. 
Agroforestry plus interaction terms equal  7.01 (0.01)**  4.14 (0.05)**  0.98 (0.32)  n. a. 
Bush-fallow plus interaction terms equal  0.61 (0.48)  0.97 (0.33)  0.32 (0.57)  n. a.  
        
 
Note:  (a)  Estimated coefficients are shown.  ** indicates significance at 1 percent level; * at 5 percent 
level, according to two-tailed t-test.  




 In the Middle Region, we find that girls tend to do even better in terms of years of 
schooling, using the random effects estimates.  In general, there are few significant 
variables in the regressions, the major exceptions being birth year and its squared term in 
the years of schooling regressions.  Such results are consistent with the egalitarian 
bequest motives of parents.    
The daughter dummy is insignificant in the Low Region (Table 9), and none of 
the interactions with the daughter dummy are significant.  It seems that parents no longer 
exhibit preferential treatment for either daughters or sons with respect to child schooling.  
However, we find that the coefficients on parental wealth variables continue to be 
significantly different from each other in the case of paddy land and bush-fallow land in 
the Middle Region (random effects estimates).  In all the regressions, the interactions of 
the daughter dummy with parents’ bush-fallow land are significantly different from each 
other.  In the Low Region, in both levels and random effects estimates, the coefficients on 






egalitarian bequest motives coexist with a collective model of household behavior in 
Sumatra. 
The closing of the gender gap in schooling reflects the general trend of increasing 
returns to female education in the Indonesian economy.  Using a nationally representative 
data set, Deolalikar (1993) found that in Indonesia, women are acquiring secondary and 
tertiary education in relatively larger numbers than men, in response to the greater 
relative returns to female higher education.  Again, using nationally representative data, 
Behrman and Deolalikar (1995) found that private rates of return to schooling 
investments in females in Indonesia are higher than those for males.  Specifically, the 
marginal increases of wage rates and earnings with post-primary schooling are greater in 












4.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
 We found that the shift from communal to individualized land tenure has been 
accompanied by a shift from a strictly matrilineal regime to one where both sons and 
daughters inherit.  In effect, it is a move towards a bilateral system of inheritance similar 
to those found in other parts of Southeast Asia, e.g., in the Philippines (Estudillo et al. 
(2000a, 2000b).  Moreover, our results show that the inheritance system is evolving to a 
more egalitarian system in which sons and daughters inherit the type of land which is 
more intensive in their own work effort.  The newly-emerging customary land tenure 
institutions, by allowing for inheritance to be consistent with comparative advantage and 
work effort by gender, seem to be incentive-compatible for men and women.  We find a 
similar phenomenon in Ghana, where wives traditionally did not inherit land from their 
husbands.  However, as demand for women’s labor in cocoa production increased, 
women who helped their husbands establish cocoa fields began to receive land from their 
husbands as a gift, with secure private rights  (Quisumbing et al., 2000). 
It is heartening that the large gender gap in schooling in the respondents’ 
generation is closing in the child generation.  Even if daughters continued to maintain 
control of land in their own right, lower levels of education would make them less likely 
to benefit from nonagricultural income earning opportunities.  If education is becoming 
more important than land in the determination of income, as in the Philippines (Estudillo 
and Otsuka, 1999), a persistent gender gap in schooling would contribute to the 
inequality in income earning capacity between men and women.  Improvements in 






of agriculture, which, with increasing population pressure, would no longer be able to 
absorb the growing labor force.  To what extent the gender gap in income persists and 
whether changes are taking place towards greater gender equality, however, need to be 







Agarwal, Bina.  1994.   A field of one’s own: Gender and land rights in South Asia. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Angelsen, Arild.  1995. Shifting cultivation and deforestation: A study from Indonesia. 
World Development, Vol. 23, pp. 1713-1729. 
 
Ault, D. E. and G. L. Rutman.  1979.  The development of individual rights to property in 
tribal Africa.  Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22 (1979), pp. 163-182. 
 
Aumeeruddy, Y. 1994.   Local representations and management of agroforests on the 
periphery of Kerinci Seblat National Park, Sumatra, Indonesia.   People and 
Plants Working Paper No. 3, Division of Ecological Sciences, UNESCO, Paris. 
 
Barlow, C. and Muharminto, 1982.  The Rubber smallholder economy. Bulletin of 
Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. 18, pp. 86-119. 
 
Becker, G. S. 1974. A theory of social interactions.  Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 
82, pp. 1063-1093. 
 
Becker, G. S. and Nigel Tomes.  1986.  Human capital and the rise and fall of families. 
Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 4, pp. S1-S39. 
 
Behrman, J. R. and Anil Deolalikar. 1995. Are there differential returns to schooling by 
gender?  The case of Indonesian labor markets.  Oxford Bulletin of Economics 
and Statistics, Vol. 57, pp. 97-117. 
 
Behrman, J. R., Robert Pollak, and Paul Taubman 1982.  Parental preferences and 
provision for progeny,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 90, pp. 52-73. 
 
Besley, Timothy. 1995. Property rights and investment incentives.  Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 103, pp. 913-937. 
 
Butcher, K., and Ann Case. 1994. The effect of sibling sex composition on women’s 
education and earnings. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, pp. 531-563. 
 
Deolalikar, Anil. 1993. Gender differences in the returns to schooling and in school 
enrollment rates in Indonesia.  Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 28, pp. 899-
932. 
 
Errington, F. K.  1984.  Manners and Meaning in West Sumatra: The Social Context of 







Estudillo, J. P. and Keijiro Otsuka. 1999.  Green revolution, human capital, and off-farm 
employment: Changing sources of income among farm households in Central 
Luzon, 1965-1995 Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 47, pp. 
497-523.  
 
Estudillo, J. P., A. R. Quisumbing, and Keijiro Otsuka. 2001. Gender difference in land 
inheritance and schooling investments in the rural Philippines. Land Economics. 
77(1): 130-143.  
 
Estudillo, J. P., A. R. Quisumbing, and Keijiro Otsuka. 2001b.  The implications of 
gender differences in land inheritance and schooling on life-time incomes: 
Evidence from the rural Philippines,” Journal of Development Studies, 
forthcoming.  
 
Feder, Gershon and David Feeny.  1993. The theory of land tenure and property rights.  
In The Economics of Rural Organization: Theory, Practice, and Policy. Karla 
Hoff, Avishay Braverman, and J. E. Stiglitz, eds.  Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Gouyon, A., H. de Foresta, and P. Levang.. 1993.  Does jungle rubber deserve its name?  
An analysis of rubber agroforestry systems in Southeast Sumatra. Agroforestry 
Systems, Vol. 22, pp. 181-206. 
 
Haddad, Lawrence, John Hoddinott, and Harold Alderman, eds. 1997.  Intrahousehold 
Resource Allocation in Developing Countries: Methods, Models, and Policy. 
Baltimore, Md., USA: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Honoré, Bo. 1992. Trimmed LAD and least squares estimation of truncated and censored 
regression models with fixed effects. Econometrica, Vol. 60, pp. 533-565. 
 
Hsiao, Cheng. 1986. Analysis of Panel Data, Econometric Society Monographs No. 11 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Kahn, J. S. 1980. Minangkabau Social Formations: Indonesian Peasants and the World 
Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Kato, T. 1982. Matriliny and Migration:  Evolving Minangkabau Traditions in Indonesia 
Ithaca, NY, USA: Cornell University Press, 1982. 
 
Lastarria-Cornhiel, Susana. 1997. Impact of privatization on gender and property rights in 
Africa.  World Development, Vol. 25, pp. 1317-1333. 
 
McElroy, M. B. 1990. The empirical content of Nash-bargained household behavior, 






Otsuka, Keijiro, S. Suyanto, Tetsushi Sonobe, and T. P. Tomich.  2001.  Evolution of 
customary land tenure and development of agroforestry: Evidence from Sumatra. 
Agricultural Economics, forthcoming. 
 
Pitt, M. M. and M. R. Rosenzweig. 1990. Estimating the intrahousehold incidence of 
illness:  Child health and gender inequality in the allocation of time. International 
Economic Review, Vol. 31, pp. 969-989. 
 
Pitt, M. M., M. R. Rosenzweig, and M. N. Hassan.  1990. Productivity, health, and 
inequality in the intrahousehold distribution of food in low-income countries, 
American Economic Review, Vol. 80, pp. 1139-1156. 
 
Place, Frank and Keijiro Otsuka.  2000a.  Population pressure, land tenure, and tree 
resource management in Uganda.  Land Economics, Vol. 76, pp. 233-251.  
 
Place, Frank and Keijiro Otsuka. 2001b. Population, land tenure, and natural resource 
management in Malawi.  Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 
forthcoming. 
 
Quisumbing, A. R. 1994.  Intergenerational transfers in Philippine rice villages: Gender 
differences in traditional inheritance customs.  Journal of Development 
Economics, Vol. 43, pp. 167-195. 
 
Quisumbing, A. R. and J. A. Maluccio.  1999.  Intrahousehold allocation and gender 
relations:  New empirical evidence.  Policy Research Report on Gender and 
Development Working Series, No. 2.  Washington, DC: The World Bank.   
 
Quisumbing, A. R. and Keijiro Otsuka. 2001. Land, Trees, and Women: Evolution of 
Land Tenure Institutions in Western Ghana and Sumatra.  IFPRI Research Report 
Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. 
 
Rosenzweig, M. R. 1986.  Program interventions, intrahousehold distribution, and the 
welfare of individuals.  World Development, Vol. 14, pp. 233-243. 
 
Suyanto, S., T. P. Tomich and Keijiro Otsuka. 2000a. Land tenure and farm management 
efficiency: The case of paddy and cinnamon production in customary land areas 
of Sumatra.  Mimeo, International Center for Agroforestry, Indonesia, and Tokyo 
Metropolitan University. 
 
Suyanto, S., T. P. Tomich and Keijiro Otsuka. 2000b.  Land tenure and farm 
management efficiency: The case of smallholder rubber production in customary 
land areas of Sumatra.  Mimeo, International Center for Agroforestry, Indonesia, 







Thomas, Duncan. 1990. Intrahousehold resource allocation: An inferential approach.  
Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 25, pp. 635-664. 
 
Thomas, Duncan. 1994. Like father, like son; like mother, like daughter: Parental 
resources and child height. Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 29, pp. 950-88. 
 
Thomas, Duncan, D. Contreras and E. Frankenberg. 1997. Child health and the 
distribution of household resources at marriage.  Mimeo, RAND Corporation.   
 
Tomich, T. P., P. Hastuti and C. P. A. Bennett. 2001. Policy failure and private initiative 
in upland agriculture: Evidence from smallholder coffee in highland Sumatra. 








                                                            
i   This discussion draws heavily on Quisumbing (1994). 
 
ii  This discussion of inheritance of different types of property is from Kahn (1980) and 
Kato (1982).  
 
iii  In some villages, earned property owned by women is passed on to their daughters; 
that owned by men is passed on to sons. 
 
iv  If newly opened land was used for permanent cultivation, such as paddy land, it was 
considered ancestral property. 
 
v   For a review of collective models of the household, see Haddad, Hoddinott, and 
Alderman (1997).  This formulation draws from McElroy’s (1990) specification of the 
Nash bargaining model and is similar to Thomas (1990, 1994).   
 
vi   For example, Thomas (1990, 1994) finds that maternal education and nonlabor 
income have a bigger impact on the height of a daughter, relative to a son, and that 
paternal education has a bigger impact on a son, relative to a daughter. 
 
vii   Families with at least two children are included so that birth order and sex dummies 
are relevant in the family fixed effects specification.  The fixed effects procedure 
eliminates selectivity bias since family size, which affects selection into the sample, is a 
family-specific variable (Pitt and Rosenzweig, 1990).    
 
viii   That is, the observed transfer, Tij, to child i in family j would be given by:  Tij = tj + 
ßXij +uij, where the family-specific effect is a dummy variable, tj, which is taken to be 
constant for a family (Hsiao, 1986).  
 
ix   On the other hand, if transfers were affected by individual heterogeneity, a random 
effects procedure would be appropriate.  The relevant model would be Tij = t + ßXij + ui 
+ vij, where the individual-specific constant terms, ui, are randomly distributed across 
families.  A Lagrange multiplier statistic tests for the appropriateness of the random 
effects model compared to ordinary least squares (OLS) without group effects, while a 
Hausman test compares the random effects model to a fixed-effects specification.   
 
x   Since the dependent variable is censored in the land transfers equations, we used 
Honore’s (1992) least-absolute-deviations estimator rather than the ordinary tobit 







                                                                                                                                                                             
xi   For more information on the dominant farming systems in Sumatra, see Angelsen 
(1995) on shifting cultivation, Tomich et al. (2000) on highland coffee, Aumeeruddy 
(1994) on cinnamon, and Barlow and Muharminto (1982) and Gouyon et al. (1993) on 
rubber. 
 
xii  The labor input data come from the sampled fields used for the computation of net 
revenue from food crops and agroforestry discussed in Suyanto et al. (2000a, 2000b).  In 
the Middle Region, wet rice, young cinnamon, and mature cinnamon fields were 
sampled.  In the Low Region, upland rice, young rubber, and mature rubber fields were 
included.  Since the focus of the study in the Low Region was the relative profitability of 
upland rice and agroforestry (rubber), we do not have data on labor input and net revenue 
in lowland rice fields. 
 
xiii  We refer to the grandchild generation as the child generation for brevity. 
 
xiv  We follow the methodology in Quisumbing and Maluccio (1999). 